

DCI LUNCHEON ADDRESS TO  
NAVY JUNIOR OFFICERS  
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD

24 August 1978

I'm really delighted to be here. First because its nice to be back in a Navy crowd and secondly, because you're the Junior Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps. I came to Washington first as a lieutenant in 1954 and I can tell you with a lot of sincerity that I don't feel like I've ever changed from being a junior officer. No matter where you go there is always somebody up above you and I've always sort of felt like the young fella trying to get along. Today I'm primarily interested in answering your questions so, although there are a couple of people in the audience, Cdr. Bobbie Hazard and Capt. George Thibault, who've written a lot of speeches for me and who know that I can hardly be short when I have a captive audience, I'm going to try to be short and mainly respond because I'm interested in talking about what you want to hear about. So I thought I'd limit myself to three quick sea stories of some of the events in my career that I found most exciting.

One was when I was a lieutenant here in 1954. It was exciting because of the man for whom I worked, Admiral William R. Smedburg. You wouldn't believe it, looking at the crowd in this room, but a lieutenant there in Washington, and particularly an OPNAV in 1954, was an oddity. I was the only officer below commander in Ops 61 when I was brought in by Admiral Smedburg as an experiment. As a result of the experiment, when he kept complaining that there should be more junior officers around the rest of OPNAV, they appointed him to a committee to figure out how to do it and he did and they changed the billet structure in OPNAV very substantially. Many of you here may be in your jobs as a result of Admiral Smedburg. The sea story with him was that one day after three or four months in his office he called me in and said, "The Secretary of the Navy just called me this morning, Thursday, and said that from now on every Monday morning at 9 o'clock he wants a briefing on what's been going on in the political/military sphere, and you're to do it Turner." Well, I felt honored. I was the only lieutenant, there were all these more senior officers who I'm sure would have loved to have had that opportunity. I said okay Admiral, I went out and thought about it, I came back and I said, "Now Admiral, here's the topics I think I ought to try to cover next Monday and if its alright with you, I'll clear these with you now and then I'll be back early Monday morning to give you a dry run, or I'll come in on Sunday, or whatever you want." He looked at me and he said, "I don't want to check your list, I don't want to hear your prebriefing,

you give it to him." I went on for a year and a half and that Admiral never told me what to say, never previewed it, never criticized it. He obviously gave me guidance from time-to-time, but he left me on my own. He said, if I'm going to trust that fellow, I'm going to tell him what I want done in general terms and let him execute it. While I was working for that Admiral, I was so intrigued and so enjoying what I was doing that I almost got out of the Navy and tried to get a job in the National Security Council, the State Department or somewhere that would be dealing with political/military affairs permanently. When I finally came to the ultimate decision to go or not, the real reason I stayed was that I loved, I respected, I had been inspired by that man. It was his leadership and the fact that he would turn over to the most junior officer in OPNAV a heavy responsibility of putting the word out to the Secretary of the Navy and all of his assistant secretaries without a lot of guidance, a lot of direction. And I would say to you looking back on my career that no matter what specific accomplishments you feel you've made in terms of impact on the organization, the tactics of the Navy, my wonderful opportunity at the Naval War College--the change of curriculum and things like this--the real rewards, the real satisfactions are feeling that maybe in some small way you've been an Admiral Smedburg; that you've helped bring out the best in other people to inspire them to do better.

My second sea story was when I was a full captain and I had commissioned a guided missile cruiser. Fourteen months later I took it to the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War in 1968. My assignment when I first arrived there on station was to sit twenty miles off a city called Vin, North Vietnam, and to be sort of a monitor for all the U.S. aircraft that were going into North Vietnam and conducting their bombing missions. The primary threat were MIGs coming down from Hanoi. There was an artificial boundary, you may remember, that we couldn't fly north of and so they had a sanctuary and every once in a while they would duck across and try to pick off, and did some times pick off, one or more of our aircraft. It wasn't a really combat campaign that they were conducting because they just did it once a month or on some infrequent basis. They weren't really trying to stop our bombing, they seemed to be either experimenting with air tactics or just doing something. Well I arrived there and I first of all did something that was I think unusual. I deserted my ship. The second day on station I found that a helicopter arrived at 8 o'clock every morning and went 100 miles back to the aircraft carrier--mail and people were always moving around--and came back in the afternoon. So two days, in a combat situation, 20 miles off an enemy coast, I left my ship and I flew over to the aircraft carrier, spent the day, and came back in the afternoon. While I was over there, I went around from ready room to ready room and I talked to the pilots, the squadron commanders and I said, "What do you want me to do if they start coming down with MIGs? I'm going to have some F-4s overhead that will be under my control that will go in and help protect the attacked aircraft, but how do you want me to run this? Do you want to come in

head-on, do you want to come in from stern, what kind of controlling do you want us to do?" I got a lot of good ideas but when it was all finished I finally made a deal with the CAG. I said, "Look, for the next week will you put a different pilot on that helo every morning and send him over to our ship." And they did. And every day we milked that pilot and we said, "How do you want us to do this?" And we got all the air controllers down on the mess decks and we sat there and we played air combat with our hands and each one, of course, told us something different depending on what aircraft he was flying, what his personal preference was, what his squadron tactics were. So at the end of the week, we sent a pilot home one afternoon and I got all the troops down there on the mess decks and I said, "Look, we've heard all these tactics, we've got to make up our own mind, we've got to have our own program." We talked about it, we got a three-dimensional map out, finally after all the discussion, I said, "Alright fellows, here's the doctrine. If we get warning, if they're more than 50 miles from the borderline when we hear about their coming, we're going to go south, cross Vietnam under the plateau or under the mountains over there, and we're going to then come north along the mountain ridge and come back at them from the west. They won't expect that. We'll zap them from the blind side. But if they don't get detected until they're closer than 50 miles just a few minutes from that cross line, we just got to go in straight right from the east, where we're located here, and do the best we can but we'll lose surprise." Everybody agreed to it, it was plan A and plan B. Two days later, at 4 o'clock the alarm rang, I sprang from my sea cabin into the combat center, they said the MIGs are coming down from the north. I said, "How far?"--70 miles-- plan A. In the next 16 minutes we had two F-4s, we engaged five MIGs, we shot one down, scared the others off, got our people back to the aircraft carrier, one of them with just two drops of gas left. During that 16 minutes I made one more decision which was yes, you're cleared to shoot, or you're not cleared to shoot. Everything else ran like clockwork because each man knew what he did under plan A or plan B. And each one not only did it but each one almost exceeded his authority in a sense and he did things that hadn't been planned but he did them better. I was very proud. And I tell you this not to boast; I tell you this because this is the nature of the profession you're in.

You have to plan the combat operations of this Navy in advance. You can't just be a hero when the moment arrives. You have one of the most intellectual professions in the world. You've got to think through these technical parameters that govern something like this combat engagement. Yes, you've got to make decisions while it's going on, but it won't work unless you've really planned it and thought it out thoroughly in all its aspects ahead of time. It's a very demanding, intellectual profession today and don't think that if you're a skipper of a ship and you've got

a computer that its going to do anything for you. It won't do anything for you if you don't know what is inside it. If you don't understand that it can control you, it can limit what you can do and you better know those limits before you run up against the stops.

Lastly, the 2nd of February 1977 I was sitting in my office as CINCSOUTH in Naples, the telephone rang, it was the Secretary of Defense, he said the President of the United States wants to see you tomorrow morning in Washington. With the help of a superb Flag Lieutenant, in 8 and 3/4 hours I was in Washington--it's almost impossible to do. The next morning, 15 minutes before I walked into the President's office, I suddenly was given enough clues to realize that I was not being called back to be given a new military assignment, which had been my presumption. So I had 15 minutes to think about what I would say if the President said CIA, because that was the only other thing I could see on the horizon. When he said that to me, I looked him back in the eye and I said, "Mr. President, I've been 31 years in the military. If I'm as qualified as you are graciously saying to be the Director of the CIA, I think those same qualities would make me very valuable to you as a military officer. I'm happy to stay where I am and wait my turn if you want me to do something else in the military. But, I really think my best contribution to you and the country is to take advantage of this training that I've had. I really feel I know what the Navy should do in the next ten years, I really feel I know how it should plan with the Army and the Air Force. I've been in a unified command job here now. I'm ready, I'm qualified, I've worked all my life for this." The President said, "CIA," politely. He said, "Its better training for you and you can make a better contribution Stan." He was right. Everything I've learned in the Navy, the management of people from Admiral Smedburg, the management of complex technical systems that you've got to psyche out, think out, figure out ahead of time, is what it takes to run the CIA and the Intelligence Community.

Intelligence is two things, its analysis of data that is collected and its the collection of that data. The analysis is a very human thing, you've got to inspire people, you've got to make them want to think more deeply, you've got to open their minds. We just have a big research activity in intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency, in my opinion, has the best, the biggest research activity in the government, in the intelligence community, and its very vital that the Central Intelligence Agency be in that business; because its the only analytic agency not subordinate to a policy maker. I am not involved in policy. I am there only to present the best objective analysis of the information we collect and you need competing analysis. You need the DIA, that does have a military bias, that does work for a military policy maker. You need the

Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, that does have a bias, that does work for another policy maker. But you need the CIA standing off doing competing analyses, keeping everybody honest.

Secondly, you collect intelligence. How do you collect it? Two ways. Technical systems--intercept signals through the air--take photographs. Or human intelligence--spies. As I said, running the technical systems is just like running a ship or an aircraft squadron or a submarine. It's the same. How do you handle these complex technical systems, make them do what you want and make them responsive. Spying is a trade unto its own but its one any of you could do if you got trained in it. Why? Because spying is salesmanship. You're selling yourself, you are selling somebody to be willing to place confidence in you and to support the cause that you are in. Here again, the CIA is our primary human intelligence activity. There is some in the Department of Defense but it's difficult to have a real, true professional human spying activity in an organization that you have to rotate people around and you have to have a certain amount of visibility to survive and get promoted in. In the CIA geared up to keep people subrosa and yet have a career pattern for them. And despite the great capabilities of our technical collection systems today, we can't get away from the importance of that human intelligence agent, the spy. Why? Because he tells you what's going to happen, why people did something that you saw in a photograph or you intercepted in a signal. You need this complementarity. And the great challenge to us today is to ensure that we are bringing about that complementarity.

Finally, I would say that there are two overall characteristics of intelligence, not only for the CIA but the entire community today, that I think are fascinating and have a real challenge. One is that the scope of what we must undertake today is much broader than ever before. In the early days after World War II, intelligence was military. Intelligence was the Soviet Union's military posture. Today, that's just as important but I have to predict the grain harvest in the Soviet Union, I have to tell people whether I think the president of such and such a country's health is going to make him survive. I have to talk about the psychology of international terrorism, the labyrinth process of international drug trafficking, the predictions of international trade and balance of payments. These are all much more critical to our country today, that is not the economic, independent giant that it was 30 years ago, or the totally dominant political force in the free world that it was 30 years ago. The world has changed around us, the demands on us in the intelligence sphere are much wider by topic and by geography. Lastly, we must collect and analyze this intelligence in a much different environment today. Ten years ago, five years ago, a DCI, like myself, would not be out making an average of one speech a week. Intelligence was secretive.

People did not talk about it and the country accepted the need for us on faith. We've lost that faith in Vietnam and Watergate and the revelations from 1975 to 1977 of abuse of intelligence privileges. So today we have to regenerate that understanding, that support in the American people for a good intelligence activity for our country. That support is basically there but they have to know more about it and there's more oversight, there's more openness today than ever before. That's good in my opinion. We can have that as long as we recognize that doesn't mean you open up the cache of secrets. You open up very deliberately those things that you know you can talk about without endangering the secrets of our country. It's an exciting, I think, historic time in American intelligence. We are evolving something quite new, quite different; what I call a unique American model of intelligence. One with much greater openness, one with considerable oversight and yet one with growing capacity not only to stay number one in the world, which we are today, but to even open the distance more on the Soviet Union. I'm confident we're going to do that in the years ahead. Let's go to your questions.

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QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: Well if you'd like me to talk about retention, I think it is the single, most important issue before the United States Navy today, and has been for many years. I heartily endorse the dynamic initiatives that Admiral Zumwalt gave to this in his tenure as the CNO. I'm spending as much or more time on retention and personnel matters in the Central Intelligence Agency as on anything because it's the same issue there, and I think we must recognize that the incentives, the rewards that brought you in and kept you in for 27 years and me the same, are different today. And that's not a criticism of you younger officers. It's an acknowledgement of the change of the climate, of the culture, of the mores in our country. And you've got to get the old foggies like you and me to recognize that those incentives that keep people motivated to stay in are different today and not have them say, well in my day it did so and so--you know, being at sea 70 percent of the time didn't bother me and my wife. Well it does today and we've got to do things in the Navy like cut down the amount of family separation and even at the expense of once in a while standing up and saying to the Secretary of Defense, "No sir, I can't make that deployment." We are such a gung-ho outfit and we have done so well for so many years by always saying, "Somehow I'll do it." But my recommendation is, when it cuts the people retention problem wrong, we've got to learn to stand up and say that's more than my personnel traffic will bear.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: The question is, I apparently tried unsuccessfully to get all the intelligence community under one hat. Who defeated me, why did I want it, am I going to try again? I'm very happy with the way that came out. The newspapers said Harold Brown and I were at each other's throats, and that he was the one who defeated me. That's not the case at all. Any two bureaucrats have different approaches to the same problem and we did not have the same approach as to how much centralization there should be. I think the President in his wisdom came to a good adjudication between us. It didn't come out the way Harold wanted it, it didn't come out the way I wanted it. Or at least it didn't come out the way each of us negotiated it. Now, I mentioned to you that you've got to bring together all these ways of collecting intelligence. You see the human intelligence used to

be the only way, 30 - 40 years ago. It has now got to complement signals intelligence, photographic intelligence. Signals intelligence comes in many varieties and its got to complement photographic and human intelligence. Intelligence collection is in the NSA, its in services, its in an agency I can't mention because of the classified title, its in the CIA, its all around the place. State Department reporting is very valuable to us. Then we have open sources such as FBIS, the Federal Broadcast Intercept Service. Now, somebody has got to make sure we don't duplicate and waste money or that we don't let things drop between the cracks between all these agencies. And its much more important today as these technical systems keep spewing in vast quantities of data. We've got to be sure we're getting what we need and not getting a lot of extraneous stuff; not letting it be overly biased towards the military in particular because the military has driven this for so many years and I'm telling you the economic and political are now of increasing in importance. So we've got to find out what of the military collection is really critical, and do it, and be sure we got enough left over to please others. The President's decision was that I have today total authority to run that--to task all the collection elements. NSA responds to my express directions, CIA responds to it, ONI in its collecting aspects. Now there's a fine line here, I don't worry about RA-5Cs off aircraft carriers. They are not in my program--it's very complicated but it's in what's called the national program, for which I also now have the budget authority. Those are the two things the President did to strengthen and centralize more so that we are very efficient in this collection area. Carefully, he did not give me (and I did not ask for) additional authority over DIA or INR in the State Department, the analytic sides of the house. As I told you, we want competition there, we want overlap there. Its cheap, it's just people cost. These others are expensive technical programs or risky programs in human intelligence.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: How do we use the CIA and what's my policy on what we call covert action or political action, influencing events abroad. The term we use in the jargon of the trade is covert action, and that's where the CIA has taken the greatest amount of beating in the media. Political action is influencing events in other countries without it being known who did the influencing. It is not intelligence, it is not an intelligence function, but it has always been assigned by presidents to the CIA as the agency that will do this if it is to be done by our government. And, of course in hindsight, we're being very criticized for the covert action in Chile and Cuba and so on. I would remind you that in 1962 there weren't many people who criticized the Bay of Pigs because we did it. They criticized it because we blew it. But the morals, the culture, the attitude of the country has changes and today if you raise the Bay of Pigs everybody criticizes the fact that we did it.



So there's some criticism in hindsight. There were mistakes made in covert action and things that shouldn't have been done. I'm not trying to be a whitewasher. Today I have two views on this as to its applicability to the United States. One, it is less applicable, it is less useful to us today. If you were going to help finance the election campaign of a free, democratic party in some free country where the opposition was, you knew, being funded by Moscow and maybe was going to take over; today, you might find that politician wouldn't take your money from the United States or from the CIA, because if he got disclosed he might lose more, and we're in an era where that kind of thing gets disclosed more. I think because the attitude of the country is changes, it would not condone another Bay of Pigs or another effort to overthrow a democratically elected government. There isn't that much applicability to the common, the standard techniques of political action. Secondly, political action today is under very tight control. There's a law that says if the President approves a political action then he must approve it in writing. I must notify eight committees of the Congress that we're going to do this. Now that isn't a guarantee that it will be publicized but you won't take something to the Congress that is so controversial that it's bound to leak. If there's a unanimity in the country behind it and the Congress really does support what you're going to do, I have no qualms about their keeping things secret, they will. If it's very tender politically and very controversial, you're in trouble. So our ability to do covert action is less today but also the usefulness of it to our country is less.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: How much damage was there from a recent compromise of an intelligence publication stolen from the CIA and sold to the Soviet Union in Athens, Greece? I'm trying to make a no comment without saying it. I'm bound not to comment very substantively because there's a probability we will take this man to court. Clearly, a breach of security is a breach of security. I can't get into how serious this particular leak is but it's a top secret document that has been lost. You all know as much about that as I.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: How bad is the morale at the CIA with all of my RIFs and so on? The straight answer to your question is I'm not the best guy to answer that obviously. The boss sometimes never knows. But my sense of it is that the morale is very much on the upswing today. There's very little discontent out there. And one of the reasons is that it has finally seeped in to the middle grade officers, GS-12s and 13s, that what I did was for them. I cut off the super structure, I cut off the deadwood at the top. It was not a question of whether it was productive or not. People will

debate whether I fired good people or whether they were all bad people. I think they were mainly good. But, they were blocking the system. They had come in when the thing was founded, they were still there. You see a group of people came in in the first four or five years and they kept moving through the system--that was spread out now from a GS-14 to a GS-18 or something--but they were holding all those spots. And if you were a GS-12 you looked ahead and you said, do I stay here. This is retention. I did this very largely for retention. And I have since published a flow-through, a promotion rate for the next five years for those people so they know what their promotion opportunity is. It's spelled out for them and they can look at it, calculate it mathematically and say, I want to stay or I don't want to stay. But they know what they're in for, whereas before they were in for stagnation. That's getting to them now and it's really having, I think, a very good affect. They're good people, they're marvelous people and I draw the analogy to our organization and the end of the Vietnam war, when we were under attack by the public. Yes your morale is down. Junior officers wouldn't come from their home to the ship in uniform because they didn't like to be seen on the streets in uniform in those days. I don't know how it is today but I don't think it's that way or at least not as bad as it was then. And we snapped back. I don't think we have that problem of worrying about our public image in the Navy that much any more. Why? Because we're good people, we've got a necessary, vital organization for our country, and a vital mission. Well the same is true for the CIA. Yes, they've been through a lull, not just because of my RIFs, but because of three years of intense battering by the public, intense questioning. We haven't quite got over that but I think, you see, it's calmed down and it's partly because we're being more open, we're telling people what we can about what we do.

Q: You mentioned some very strong feelings about the future of the Navy in the next ten years. Could you share some of your ideas with us?

A: My feelings of the Navy for the next ten years. I was afraid that question would come up. I'm not frankly optimistic. I'm not optimistic because we don't have a Navy. We've got at least three navies. And each one is going its own way--submarines, aviation and destroyers. In general they each think they know how the war is going to be fought and they each generally think they're going to do it. I'm oversimplifying, but I'm saying to you that if you people coming along don't overcome this; if you don't bring us together as one navy and understand that you cannot win a war at sea without submarines, without aviation, without surface ships, and that they've got to work together in a team. It's the same as my teamwork in intelligence. It's got to fit together. The problem is so much greater today--maintaining control of the seas--than its ever been. The submarines, as you know, are faster, longer lived, longer weapons; airplanes can shoot

at you from immense distances. I don't worry much about the Soviet surface threat which everybody gets excited about. I think that's going back to Albert Mahan, who was out-of-date before he wrote. But with that greater threat, with a greater distance in which we can be attacked at sea, you've got to bring all these things together. You've got to have the extended eyes and ears of the aviation. You've got to have the stealth and the ability of the submarine--to go into harm's way without being detected. But what you are trying to do in the long run is keep surface ships afloat; be able to get merchant ships as well as war ships from point A to point B. And if you can't keep the destroyers that protect them afloat, you can't keep the payload afloat. So you've got to have the destroyers too, you've got to play it as a team. And I just hope and pray that you will come up in a more ecumenical attitude than many of us who have preceded you.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: No comment. I'm out of the policy and political business. But I would say to you that my personal opinion is that to buy another large nuclear carrier would be an irresponsible act.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: Wow, that's a big and tough one. I'm going to answer it in a way that may sound unduly conceited and I don't mean it that way. But when I came over here in the car today and thought about telling you those three sea stories, I said it would be nice if instead of telling you about one of my own operational experiences and how I worked out a tactical problem, I could tell you of Admiral so-and-so who inspired me because he did that. And I'm sorry, I can't. And I'm equally concerned about the future of Navy tactics, because people are not thinking tactics, they're thinking engineering. They're thinking not getting before the green table. And as a fleet commander, I called in a ward room full of skippers one day and had a tactical chalkboard and I just can't tell you how depressing it was. When I asked the skipper of a great big amphibious ship I said, "How are you going to hide your ship if you're out in a combat zone?" He said, "Well I can't hide it Admiral, it's 750 feet long." I said, "Captain, your ship is more than steel. It radiates heat, it radiates electronics, it does a lot of things and you can hide it, or you can confuse, or you can do things to make people think it's something that it isn't." So, we're not thinking tactics. We're not thinking tactics because we have not defined what we want to accomplish. We don't understand that there are four things that navies do: they participate in the strategic deterrence for our country, they project power ashore either with amphibious or aviation forces or guns

and missiles in the future maybe when we get them long enough range; or you conduct sea control--the ability to move things across the sea or to deny somebody else the ability to move across the sea--and you conduct naval presence in peacetime. You display the capability to conduct one of those three other combat missions. And by so doing you help the foreign policy of our country. Those are the things to do. And if you start from there and define what tactics you need to use to get there, we get somewhere. But we're all running off finding the tactics that suit our particular platform but do not suit the mission that we're told to do. The most important are the ones that we have overall or how we conduct our tactics in coordination with other forces.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: I think it's more the latter. I certainly don't dispute the need for tremendous technical engineering expertise in the Navy or Marine Corps of the 1970s and 80s and on. There's no question we've got to have lots of people, the majority of our people, come out of the engineering side of the educational spectrum. But we have to also have people who understand the profession and what it is and why we're doing it. And we have to generate within the profession a thirst for understanding the mission and developing the tactics--which is partly a technical matter, it's partly a human matter. It's a climate, it's a attitude, it's a desire on your part to develop the new tactics, to find out how to use the new systems that are coming along. That's got to be generated.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: I've not seen that evolving at all and I still sense a strong revulsion in the Congress overall against covert action in the Southern Africa situation.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: How is our recruiting climate, how are we doing and where do we get our people? One of the reasons that I have great hope for the CIA, for the Navy, is that we have such wonderful young people coming along and coming into our organizations. And despite all the bad press, the CIA has not really had a dip in its recruiting capability over these last years. This last month we had more applications than we did last year for this month. Last May we put an ad in the New York Times and we got five times as many applications in that May as we've had in the previous Mays. Now, one can never tell right off the bat whether the quality is up, I don't want to be too complacent. We don't see a drop in quality, but you don't

necessarily perceive that in the first year or two if it is there. But their statistical background and so on are excellent. We get them from 150 different universities where we go and recruit and we get them from others who hear about us and come to us. But we go out on the campus, perfectly openly with our own little shingle and recruit. But we're more interested actually in people who have a college degree and three or four years of working experience. Now I'm talking against myself here because I could almost try to advertise to a lot of you because you're really just exactly what we want. I don't want you to get out of the Navy. We like people with three or four years in the military. We like people with three or four years in business. Why? Particularly on the spy side of the house, other than perhaps being a junior officer of the watch, of the deck, on a fairly major ship of the Navy, I don't know anywhere you get much more responsibility suddenly thrown on you than being a case officer for the United States Central Intelligence Agency in a foreign country. You're not operating in a Marine platoon where somebody is telling you when to step left and step right. You are out there on your own and you're out there with the reputation of this country on your back as you work the street at night and do the things that we have to do in order to gain human intelligence. So we like people with a little more maturity, a little more judgment than just a college graduate. A college graduate would get it in time but if we can pick them off at 27, 28, that's where we like to do our recruiting and they come from all kinds of ways and walks of life and we're pushing women too--we need more women case officers. But I'm not here to proselytize because I really hope you all will stay in the Navy. I hope you'll realize that all of us have gone through the: "Gee, couldn't I both make more money and have more fun and more family life or something if I got out" phase. I didn't really go through that phase, just when I was a lieutenant. I went through it all the way up through 4-star admiral. And don't think you ever make a career decision. I'm serious. In every rank, practically, I had to sit there and weigh the alternatives and say, am I going to have greater contributions by staying in or by going out and doing thus and so. It's always with you. But in my case the rewards have been tremendous. And being able to contribute to our country is as rewarding an activity as you can find. I commend it to you, although I expressed some pessimistic tone to you about the Navy today, overridden on top of all that is my confidence in you, those of you coming up because you'll whip these tactical, strategic, devisive problems that we are facing. I wanted to point them out to you but I'm confident that you'll carry the torch and we'll get there.

**C.T.**

**CASSETTE  
TAPE**

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